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LOOKING AT EUROPE A CONTINENTAL 
TRADE UNION VIEWPOINT 
Harm Buiter 
Secretary of the European Trade Union Secretariat, 
which groups the Confederation of the Free Trade 
Unions of the Six Community countries. Formerly 
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Mr. Buiter was Secretary of the Committee of Twenty-
One (see below paragraph 4). This article summarises 
his contribution to a Conference "Trade Unions and 
the New Europe" held in London last March and 
organised by Britain in Europe. 
European integration has social implications which trade unionists 
cannot disregard. The outstanding developments have been the creation 
of the three Communities of the Six countries - Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. The only practical 
experience gained so far has been in the European Coal and Steel Communit3 
(ECSC) which has existed for seven years. The European Economic Communit3 
(the Common Market) and Euratom only came into being at the beginning of 
1958, and some time must of course elapse before their influence can be 
assessed. 
The decisions to set up these Communities were political rather 
than economic, though each of these organisations operates in the 
economic field. It is very important to bear this factor in mind when 
considering European economic integration. In the case of the ECSC, the 
intention was to place the basic industries of France and Germany under 
a European government in order to forestall a recurrence of the wars 
which have devastated Europe. The two new Communities are designed to 
carry this objective a stage further. 
Trade unionists have played a major role in the ECSC. When the 
treaty establishing the ECSC was negotiated, all the delegations -
except that from Luxemburg - had trade union leaders amongst their 
members. They worked together to press the trade union viewpoint, and 
were so far successful that a leading trade unionist was co-opted as 
the ninth member of the High Authority. (He was Monsieur Paul Finet, 
a Belgian who has been President of the High Authority since January 
1958). Trade unionists were also appointed to the Court of Justice. 
In the Consultative Committee representing the coal and steel industries, 
and which advises the High Authority, one third of the fifty-one members 
are trade unionists. 
The integration of industries also made necessary the integration 
of trade unions. The metal and coal workers established a special 
committee to represent their interests in the Community, which became 
known as the Committee of Twenty One - the number of members. It was 
a hard job to work out a common policy despite the trade union traditions 
of international brotherhood. As a rule international organisation 
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had been confined to the exchange of information. There were, more-
over, major differences in their approaches to trade union problems. 
Whereas the French unions relied on winning government support and 
achieving their objective by legislation, the Germans imployed the 
methods of collective bargaining as they enj.oyed no government backing. 
The formation of the Community has helped the trade unions to 
integrate. There is now comparable information about conditions of 
work in the coal and stee'l industries in all six countries. Problems 
relating to these are considered by mixed committees of workers and 
employer$. For instance, it was shown that the hours of work - 52 per 
week - in French industry were much longer than in the other countries. 
The pressure of opinion in the mixed committees led the French employers 
to agree to a reduction of four hours. 
Another problem concerned the free movement of labour. To meet it, 
agreements were made between unions for transfers of membership. Never-
theless the trade unions foresaw - and events have proved them right -
that little movement would in fact take place, as it has been restricted 
to skilled workers. But some migrant workers, brought in under special 
arrangements, have been difficult to organise in trade unions, especially 
when they have come from areas without trade union traditions; a case 
in point is the Italians in the Belgian coal mines. Much depends, 
however, on whether the migrant workers come just for a few years, or 
whether they can be persuaded to settle permanently. 
Sometimes the employment of foreign labour results in unavoidably 
irrational wage structures. Thus, Belgians working across the frontier 
in France are paid 19 per cent more than the French workers beside them, 
and Belgian girls working at the Philips works in Holland are paid more 
than ])utch girls. These are not isolated cases, and are a consequence 
of the economic division of :Europe. The movement of labour is needed, 
but it would be checked by differences in national conditions unless 
special allowances were offered. 
Trade unions have also tried to Dake their voice heard in the 
crisis which has developed in the past year in the ECSC. They have 
been active in putting forward proposals for tackling the problems for 
labour arising from the surplus of coal. The High Authority itself 
has sought to meet the situation in a number of ways, for instance by 
financing stocks of coal and by the payment of allowances to miners 
on short time. But effective action has been held up by the opposition 
of one or another of the governments in the Community, so that now 
there is serious short time working and unemployment in Germany and 
Belgium. 
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The Belgian crisis has been particularly acute. T~e mines in 
Belgium are scattered and old. Over a hundred are due to have been 
closed. Working conditions are often very unsafe, and productivity is 
low. Consequently a Belgian miner is only able to produce one ton, 
Whereas a French miner produces one and a half tons of coal per shift. 
About £60 million have been made available by the High Authority 
and the Belgian Government for the reorganisation of the mines. But 
. . 
the money was misused by the nineowners, owing to inadequate supervision 
over them. Then_ early this year three quarters of the mines in the 
Borinage, where there are no alternative means of employment, were to 
have been abruptly closed. This sparked off a bitter miners' strike. 
The time was perhaps inopportune for a strike, but it was effective 
politically, as it highlighted the crisis and those responsible for it. 
The Belgian Government has been forced to allocate nearly £180 million 
for the redevelopment of the region. Unemployed miners are guaranteed 
a new job in the area within six months. The trouble, of course, is 
that this planning has come about ten years too late. 
The handling of the coal crisis illustrates the increasing diffi-
culties of late in obtaining concerted planning and action by the six 
governments. Since the ECSC was established the political atmosphere 
has become less favourable to the left. It was harder to get trade 
union representatives into the delegations who negotiated the Rome 
Treaties establishing the Common Market and Euratom. Both these trea-
ties are less satisfactory to labour than was the ECSC treaty. 
But the repercussions of the Common Market on the economies 
concerned are bound to be much greater. It is essential therefore that 
trade unionists should press their views on such matters as full 
employment. There are thirty-five trade unionists amongst the one 
J:1ri.nil.red and one members of the Economic and Social Com.mi ttee of the 
Common MA.rket. And, to facilitate trade union action, an office*has 
been opened Jn BrusseJ9 in:, rollow the activities of the Committee. 
However, there are no trade unionist members on the Commissions of 
either the Common Market or Euratom, though there are several members 
whose political views make them sympathetic to the trade union 
viewpoint. 
The political climate today is also less favourable to European 
integration than it was. It is in fact surprising that France is 
staying in the institutions already set up, when one considers past 
statements by the present French leaders such as Monsieur Debre, the 
Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the longer France remains in the 
Communities, the harder it will be for her to withdraw. 
At the moment there are six right-wing governments in the 
*The European Trade Union Secretariat, whose Secretary is Mr. Buiter. 
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Community. In addition thE., trade union movement in France and Italy 
is seriously split between Communist, Socialist and Christian unions. 
In the Netherlands it is split between .Protestant, Roman Catholic 
and Socialist unions. The Socialists and the Christians work together 
fairly well nowadays, but their attitudes differ on various subjects. 
There are also differences in attitudes between the various countries, 
for example towards the question of public ownership. In Germany there 
is co-determination but no planning, ·whereas planning is accepted in 
France. The labour movement must deal with this situation. The Germans 
would like to extend co-determination to Luxemburg bece:u.se GGrrnan 
industrialists are moving there. 
Trade unj_onists have continued to support European integration 
because the success of a trade union movemont dep0nds ·on economic and 
social conditions. In Europe these conditions in onG country depend 
on the policies followed in another. For instance the three Benelux 
countries feel grGater effects from German policy than from their own. 
Today Socialism is impossible on a national scale. 
All the :European trade unions, apart from the Communists, have 
supported European co-operation. But the trade unions in the Six 
have shared with the other supporters of integre,tion the desire to go 
much further. This is based on a feeling of COilL'IlOn civilisation and 
determination that Europe should not re:m.c:dn split up. 
• • PAGE 6 
A LITTLE FREE TRADE AREA? 
At no stage has Britain been indifferent to the creation of the 
European Common Market; nor could she afford to be. Almost from the 
very start, once it became clear that the Common Market stood a reason 
able chance o:f coming into being, the British aim has been to negotiate 
a loosBr form of association embracing all seventeen members of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation ( m~EC). The intention 
was to establish a single free trading zone for virtually the whole of 
Western Europe (Spain would not have participated), without having to 
introduce the more far-reaching measures for economic integration 
envisaged for the Common Market, which would itself have formed part 
of this larger association. 
But this response to the cha_llenge of the Common Market met a 
sharp rebuff last November when the negotiations for a European Free 
Trade Area broke down. Ever since then it has been clear that the 
govE:rnment would have to find another formula; scarcely anybody thought 
that nothing should be done; a Little European Free Trade Area is the 
outcome. 
The idea of having a restricted free trade area of this kind has 
been increasingly discussed in recent months. The argmnent is that if 
a free trade area cannot at present be agreed with the members of the 
Common Market, then as many as possible of the other members of OEEC 
should go ahead on their own. This is, of course, only one of the many 
ideas canvassed in recent months. It has, for instance, been seriously 
proposed that Britain should after all join the Common Ifarket. Others, 
recognising that this could gravely strain our economic ties with the 
rest of the Commonwealth, have recommended that an at tempt be made to 
establish firm commercial links between the entire Commonwealth - or 
most of it - and Europe, leaving Britain freer to enter into greater 
European commitments than might be practical otherwise. A solution 
along these lines, for all its obvious merits, however, would be 
exceedingly complex to work out. 
By mid-May it became clear that the government 'Nas actively pur-
suing the expedient of a Little Free Trade Area with the other 
interested governments. The details are being worked out with great 
speed. Provided no major obstacles are encountered, a treaty may well 
be signed and ratified by the end of this year. 
The most likely members would be Britain, the three Scandinavian 
countries (Deni'llark, Norway and Sweden), Austria and Switzerland together 
with Portugal, who has shown a:n unexpected interest in participating. 
Sometimes referred to as the Outer Seven, these are the members of OEEC 
most directly affected by the Common 1'fiarket of the Six - France, Germany, 
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Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. The remaining members of 
OEEC - Iceland, Greece and Turkey - arc remaining on the sidelines for 
the time being since they would r0q_uire special treatment in this as in 
any new European trading arrangement. 
The central feature of the Little Free Trade Area is likely to be 
the fairly rapid abolition of obstacl2s to trade between member countries. 
Austria apparently wants the pace to be the same as that in the Common 
:Market - that is, spread over a p0riod of twelve to fifteen years. But 
the other countries, anxious to prove that the idea of a free trade area 
is sound, seem bont upon quicker measures. At one stage there was a 
preference, by :Britain at any rate, for the elimination of tariffs by 
the end of next year on all goods except the products of a few sensitive 
industries. The most probable compromise, however, is likely to be 
along the lines of the Swedish proposal for cutting tariffs by 20 per 
cent each year for five years or so, with again some exceptions for 
each country. 
It may be expected that the British exceptions would include such 
industries as paper, ball bearings, special alloy steels, high precision 
tools, watches r,nd some chemicP,ls. Altogether n,bout 15 per cent of 
British mr.,nufn.cturing v:ould be clnssifhid RS sensitive, 2,nd more or 
less the srune :proportion in the other countries. Agriculture r.nd 
fisheries would be excluded for ~~11 ..countries, though an undertRking 
to ease treding in these sectors would certainly be necessRry if the 
Dnnish and Norwegin.n interests 1.:~re to be se .. tisfied. 
No one pretends th2,t a Little Free Trnde Area would be a complete 
substitute for the 12,rger scheme. The Outer Seven do not ~natch up the 
Six. Their combined populRticn is 88 million (51 million in Britain 
alone) compnred with 165 million in the Common Market; and then there 
are nn additionesl 34 n:;.illion in the four unatte,ched countries which 
would have pqrticipe..ted in P, full--scnle Europee,n Free Trc,de Area. 
Populc,tion alone is, of course, not the only bEt.sis for comp 01risons, and 
it is well-known that the Outer Sev,cJ:n - Portugal excepted - all have 
high standards of living. Even so their joint natiom..,,1 incomes are less 
than two thirds of the totc,;,l for the Common Market, and traditj_onRl 
trading nations though they r=:,re their total trp,de is b2,rely three 
quRrters of the Common M2rket's. 
Their trading interest with one c:1,nother is also gener2.,lly less than 
with the Common ME',rket, though this is not quite so true of the 
Scandinnvian countries. In 1958 the Outer Seven carried out only 
17 per cent of their e.,"'Cparts amongst themselves, but 23 per cent of their 
exports went to the Common Market r:ti1d 28 per cent of their imports 
cai.ne from it. The Six, by c ontrr:i.,st, transacted JO per cent of their 
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trade with one another, obtained only 16 per cent of their imports 
from the Outer Seven and s2nt 22 per cent of their exports to them. 
The Outer Seven c:0,re ge ogre..prLLocdly dispersed and economically 
vulnerable. Austria o.nd Switzerle,nd nre both wedged into the Common 
Market, and la.ck un:i.m:peded access by land or sea to their other pros-
pective partners. Both countries conduct about half their trade with 
the Common Ivlarket, and little more than n tenth with other countries in 
the Outer Seven, Denmr..1-rk is very awkwardly placed because Germany is 
normally almost as important a market as Bri tRin for her foodstuffs. 
In addition, the long run economic gains from free tr~de amongst 
the Outer Seven are unlikely to be substa:i:rtial. In recent years their 
economies have not expanded anything like as fast as have those of the 
Six. And free trade alone, without concerted international :planning, 
will hardly make much dif:t'erence ·to the relative r0..tcs of growth between 
the two groups. It has been estimated thD,t in 1970 the gross product 
of the Common Market should be :,\bout 60 per cent more than in 1955, but 
the increase for the Outer Seven may not be moro than 12 per cent. 
As a rival bloc the Outer Seven may not be p2.,rt:Lculc1rly impressive. 
But it has one source of yJotential strength. Its members export to the 
Common Mr.~r.lrnt less than three q_uarters of what they import from it. 
This means that by introducing free trP.,de arnongst one nnother they can 
incre0,se commetce within the zone at the expense of the Co:11mon Market. 
It is estimated that Britain could _possj_bly expand exports by £100-200 
million a year this way. Certainly the motor cr~r manufacturers are 
looking forward to recapturing the lend from the Germfans in the 
Swedish market. 
There are, however, limits to the scope for exploiting these 
openings. Sevural of the Outer Seven are vulnerable to reprisals from 
the Common Market countries, as have ·been pointed out. 
It mr,y well be wondered in the. light of theoe considerations 
what the point of the scheme is. To appreciate this it is necessary to 
understand the refusal of the British Government to enter into a 
custons union with the Six, which could destroy the system of Common-
wealth Trading Preferences, and its reluctance to accept many other 
features of the Common lVlarket. The hope is that the Six will eventually 
come round to accepting a Free Trade Area for all OE:EC countries if 
they see a pilot scheme working satisfactorily. Pressure will also be 
exercised through the damage their own trade may suL:'er from allowing 
the division of Western Europe to deepen. 
This hope then providos the real justification for the scheme, 
and should in fact determine the shape j_t takes. So far opinions on 
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the subject are not clear-cut. Some hold the view that it should not 
be too elaborate, if this is only a temporary solution, scarcely more 
than a bold diplomatic manouevre. fut to others the opposite argument 
may seem more compelling. The Outer S0ven should seize the opportunity 
for establishing more effective institutional machinery for the co-
ordination of economic policies in order to ensure the maintenance of 
full employment and to attain a more rapid rate of growth. Furthermore, 
a fresh Gxamination should be made of problems effecting underdeveloped 
countries outside :Europe, particularly those in the Commonwealth. 
These qu8stions will certainly be crucial to any attempt at a 
later stage to forge a link between the Six and the Outer Seven, should 
their Little Free Trade Area ever come into being, no less than if it 
fails. The stage has been reached when a further setback to efforts at 
European economic integration could not but have extremely serious 
consequences. There is all the more reason therefore to consider 
bolder measures going beyond l~rgely co1.i.lillercial schemes for free trade, 
not to mention the possibilities for bringing the Commonwealth more 
generally into the :European picture. 
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TRADE UNIONISTS RALLY TO SUPPORT OF 
THE COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
PAGE 10 
May 14 was a black day for the European Coal and Steel Comm.unity 
(ECSC). Meeting at Strasburg, the Community's Council of Ministers 
rejected the High Authority's plan to meet the coal crisis*. Since 
then the trade unionists of the six countries have reacted strongly. 
Both the :E1ree and the Christian Trade Unions have rallied to the 
support of the High Authority, pointing out the dangers of weakening 
the Community, and calling on member governments to observe not only 
the letter but also the spirit of the treaties they have signed. 
The dangers of the situation were underlined by the European 
Trade Union Secretariat, representing the confederations of the free 
trade unions of the six countries, in a declaration published in 
Brussels on May 21. This statement expressed their fears at the 
recent political trend shown by the six governments, away from that 
desire for progressive economic integration which they had professed 
in the past 7 towards a mere voluntary co-operation between governments. 
This - the Declaration went on - had entailed not only an abuse of the 
voting procedures laid down in the treaties and the implementation of 
only a minimum of their provisjons, but also outright opposition to 
attempts by the European authorities set up within the Communities to 
exert their proper powers. In refusing their agreement to the High 
Authority's proposal to meet the coal crisis tho governments had denied 
any European solution to the problem. 
Th(~ Declaration reaffirmed the trade unions' belief that only 
economic integration could ensure the progressive social development 
of the six countries; it concluded with an urgent appeal to governments 
to apply the treaties in the spirit in which they were intended - namely 
as a step towards a United Europe. 
At the end of the month a similar appeal was made by the Committee 
of the Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the ECSC. This put the 
major blame for the coal crisis on the member governments of the 
Community, and pointed out that their failure to come to a decision 
about the renewal of the term of office of the High Authority (which 
expired on February 10) had made it impossible for the European 
executive to rally the support and confidence needed for the approval 
of its plans to meet the crisis. 
Both these statements show the strength of the support among the 
* See EUROPE'S HUGE COAL SURPLUS in the European Labour Bulletin for 
February 1959. 
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non-Communist trade unions of the six co1mtries for the Communities 
and, in particular, for their European executives. The political 
issue of who should have the effective say within the institutions 
is of fundamental importance to the unions, as their statements show. 
The question is not whether the six governments will carry out their 
obligations under the treaties for, barring some quite unforeseeable 
turn of events, the economic pressures already at work will lead 
inevitably to the creation of the full Cormnon Market. What matters 
is the spirit in which the governments will act. 
Although the three governments - of France, Germany and Italy -
which opposed the High Authority's plan acted from widely differing 
motives, the political attitude of the first two towards Community 
executive institutions has clearly undergone a substantial change 
since the ECSC Treaty was formulated. This was already clear in 1957 
at the time of the signing of the Rome Treaties. Although these 
provide for the possibility of an eventual reinforcement of the powers 
of the Executive Commissions it is now clear that the two major powers 
among the Six are in no haste - to put it mildly - to move in that 
direction. The dangers of this are precisely those foreseen by the 
authors of'the Schuman Plan. It was they who insisted on the need for 
strong central institutions, equipped with the necessary powers to 
enforce - among other things - common rules of fair competition. It 
is all the more evident to-day that unless the Common Market itself is 
equipped with such rules, and the means for their enforcement, 
industrial pressure may thwart the basic intention of the Common Market. 
Large enterprises, and groups of enterprises, would then gain as firm 
a control over the wider market as they have had in the past in the 
smaller national markets. 
The political problem from this aspect becomes an economic problem 
too; the failure to reach political agreement on the way to resolve the 
coal crisis shows this very clearly. Now that the governments have 
rejected a Community approach only piecemeal solutions are possible. 
It is doubtful how effective they will be even in the short run to meet 
what is a continuing, and what may well become a deepening, crisis. 
The latest figures show, for instance, that in April pithead 
coal stocks rose to 30 million tons, Germany having added almost 
another million tons to its load of unsold coal, followed closely by 
France with another 877,000 tons. 
What is being done to meet the situation? The High Authority 
has reserved the right to introduce its concerted plan again later on 
if the situation gets worse. Meantime it is working on a series of 
special measures for the most seriously affected industry, that of 
Belgium. The Council of Ministers agreed to a number of its proposals 
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in May, and a comprehensive plan for the re-organisation of the Belgian 
mines is to be considered by a six-nation conference of experts. In 
the meantime another ten Belgian mines are to be closed in the current 
year, and Belgian production is to be reduced by ten percent from 1958 
to 24.3 million tons in 1959. The High Authority has also requested 
the Belgian Government to take steps to reduce its imports of coal from 
non-Community countries to a maximum of 1.45 million tons, a cut of one 
third compared with last year. For workers affected by short-time 
working, a total of £1.8 million is being set aside by the High 
Authority for special aid. 
For the rest, individual governments are taking measures (which 
must, of course, be in conformity with the treaty) to meet their own 
particular problems. In Germany for example reliance is being placed 
on a prohibitive tariff on non-Community coal imports, and the intro-
duction of a 5-day 40-hour week in the mines. The European 
Parliamentary Assembly has now called on other countries to follow the 
German example by also introducing a 40-hour week for miners. 
It remains to be seen what effects these measures will produce. 
But if the short term situation must continue to give rise to anxiety, 
the long term prospect is even more' disturbing. Here the problem 
revolves about the possibility for the Community of a co-ordinated 
energy policy. Only by this means - or a radical revision of the 
existing ECSC Treaty :.: could a clear future be mapped out for the coal 
industries of the Comm.unity. The present absence of any provisions 
for a concerted comm_ercial policy for coal impo:i..ts, short of the 
application Of, the ~eaSUre COnnected With a I ~anifest CriSiS I·. ( Which 
the governments have clearly indicated thGy are unable to accept), is 
/ , ' ' 
not a temporary difficulty bu.t one which promises to be a constant 
threat to thG cohesion of the Coal and Steel Community. Faced by the 
prospe,6t of continuing cheap sourcfes- of ·non-Oormrrunity -boar~· ahd- by 
increasing oompetitio:n from ·other fuels,>the future;- is extremely '. 
.uncertain for- what in the past• has been· iri- the six ·countries: - : as ,in -· 
our own ·country - a ina'j or -b'asic ·industry. · 
It is not surprising then that trade unionists in the Community, 
lc/okirig ahe'ad, see ih the re'inforceinent' of' ·ex'istirig 'comm.unity' iristi tu-
tions the only ·sure hope of a;·· just and' practical solution to' economic 
problems, a~' w'eil: as' the' only certai~- way t'owards a politically united 
j • ',: .... ,: • • ' ' 
western :SUrope. ' 
• 
FRENCH TRADE .UNIONS AND 
THE FIF•rH · REPUBLIC 
by 
G. Ventejol 
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Secretaire Confederal, CGT Force Ouvriere -- the 
socialist trade unions in France; and a member of 
the Consultative Committee of the European Economic 
Community. 
The highlight of 1958 was. our st.ruggle for the respect of basic 
democratic liberties. We were opposed, in conjunction with others, to 
anything which might have been an illeg~l attempt to take power by 
force. Even today the threa:ts have not altogether disappeared. Our 
aim therefore is to make the Force Ouvriere the dynamic centre for 
gathering together men deeply attached to collective and individual 
liberties and to social justice. 
So.cial justice was seriously undermined at the end of December 
1958. The devaluation of the francj the consequent rises in prices, 
the cuts :Ln Social Welfare benefits, the fairly general wage f'reeze 
( no less effective for not having been decle.red), all these provoked 
resentment, the more lively because many Frenchmen had believed in 
miraculous solutions from the new policies. In fact the sacrifices, 
some of which are highly questionable, weigh heavily on the workers. 
So much then for the "reforms". So far as the way in Which the 
decisions were taken is concerned, it is worth pointing out that they 
were taken in great secrecy without any consultation with the trade 
union movement. The employers on the other hand were re1)resented on 
the Rueff Committee which recommended the ref'orm.s, and it may be said 
that their views prevailed. Article. 20 of the 1959 finance law goes 
so far as to stop all consultation with workers where changes in Social 
Welfare provisions are concerned.. This cold shouldering of the trade 
union movement has added to the discontent among workers. 
The stande .. rd of living of workers in :France has slowly deteriorated. 
From the.middle of 1958 industrial activity began to decline while 
total and :partia.l .unemployment incre~sed. The decline of hours 
worl{ed, even exceeded that in 1952, a ;y-ear of re.cess.ion. The average 
working waek dropped from 46 hours to 44. It was recently estimated, 
that 40 per cent of workers had been affected by more or less important 
reductions in working hours. 
At the so.me time as workers' incomes have qeen falling, prices 
have been rising. Between the middle of 1957. and the beginning of 
1959t prices rose by about 20 per cent. It is estimated that a 
•• • 
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further rise of over 5 per cent occurred in the first quarter of this. 
year, and it is still far from certain tlnt the end is in sight. 
Whatever may be the result, this diminution of purchasing power has 
weighed heavily on working class budgets, independently of the recent 
measures restricting Social Welfare benefits. 
It is the worst-off consumer who has be2n most affected. He 
bears the brunt of the sacrifices, and it is difficult for him to 
overtake the price spiral. The goverr.iment, after having "granted" a 
4 per cent se.lary rise to officials and civil servants in the public 
sector, "enjoined" the employers not to exceed this average percentage 
for workers in the private sector. This is but a new and slightly 
disguised form. of national wages policy. 
Is it social injustice? We have said so! But will the economic 
difficulties be overcome? It is by no means certain that we shall 
expand exports sufficiently to counteract the effects of the 14-17 
per cent devaluation. Will our neighbours import our :products? 
Indications so far are not very encouraging. To diminish internal 
demand without increasing external demand would be more than social 
injustice; it would result in an accumulation of stocks, and in the 
long run greater unemplo;y111ent. 
Much is apparently expecteq from new investment to revive the 
economy and to restore its expansion. As far as private investment 
is concerned, it may be wondered whether employers will be able a!l:d 
willing to carry out investment for future expansion, if current order 
books do not appear to warrant it. As regards investment in the public 
sector, the basic choice aris:~s between productive projects and un-
productive ones however desir~ble. But it is no use pretending that 
everything is possiblEl everywhere at one and the same time. We there-
fore pin our hopes on proauctive investment in the public sector which 
is moreover indispensable for building an economically and socially 
united Europe. 
Against this background one question stands out. It is a question 
which will be asked in all countries where events in Europe are being 
closely followed. Can ::Europe really stand for economic and social 
values, when it includes Frr,,nce where through neglect they can be the 
more easily suppressed? 
In these circumstances the function of the trade union movement 
in France is more than ever to stand by its principles and to find a 
new humanism which the rest of the world can recognise and respect. 
We muet arouse public opinion and concentrate our propaganda even 
more on the conditions for a real economic and social democracy. 
· It will be difficult, but we are convinced the.t we are on the right 
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road. The danger is sorj_ous, es we are living at a time when most men 
are prepared to place their destiny in tbo han::l.s of others, and to 
forget their duties as citizens. Our duties must be to draw attention 
to the facts to make men concious of their responsibilities as citizens 
and to give them the possibility of participating fully in a social 
and economical life bound by a common ideal. 
The world is watching us and expects something from us. We 
have a clear message to give. Above all poverty and ignorance must 
be rt1moved. The free countries should make a common effort to ensure 
under'.'"'developed countries their independence, and steady economic and 
socJ.aJ.. :progress. While we must avoid encouraging the illusion that 
such cauntries can quickly reach the standard of living of the 
western countries, we should give them the assurance that their 
evolution is guaranteed by the free countries, 
The ste..kes are high; they concern the freedom of the world, 
our own freedom. By conquering ignorance and poverty we can help to 
bring freedom to these countries. Let us give them the means to 
enjoy more than a bowl of rice. 
Between the traditional capitalist solution and the temptation to 
drift into dict!;l.torship, which is synonymous with economic efficiency 
for some people, we must offer to t 1::ose countries a third solution 
which will me1rn possible economic growth, social justice and the 
respect of human liberties. We must create economic conditions 
to the measure of man. 
A great opportunity is offered the free trade unions to help 
bring all this about, and to this e,nd we must strive to work together 
more closely than ever before. 
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SPECIAL FEATURE 
!_RADE UNIONS IN EUROPE: 
I- W'EST GERMANY 
An article largely based on information provided by 
the DGB (the German Trade Union Federation), the 
first in a series of articles to be published in the 
- European Labour Bulletin on trade unions in European 
countries. 
The trade union movement has played a major role, all too often 
overlooked, in the pol:L tic al and economic recovery of West Germany. In 
size, prestige and authority, it is greater today than ever before in 
German history. Without the active cooperation of the trade unions the 
so-called German economic "miracle" could never have taken place. Now 
that the reconstruction :phase is over the trade unions are bending their 
energies, with impressive success, to advance the claims of the working 
classes for a lacger share of the national product and a bigger voice 
in the direction of the economy. 
Trade unions, amongst the first.of the organisations singled out 
by Hitler for suppression, were also amongst the very first to revive 
after the war. From the purgatory of those years, 1933 to 1945, and 
from the events lea.ding up to them, t:rade unionists learnt one basic 
lesson: the need for working class unity. Previously, besides many 
splinter groups, trade unions had been divided along ideological lines 
into socialists (over 70 per cent of the total), Catholics (nearly 20 
per cent) and Liberals. Nowadays political and religious differences 
remain only as an unhappy memory of former working-class disunity. 
In consequence,. the trade unions have deliberately avoided a close 
link-up with any of the political parties. This neutrality does not, 
of course, mean that they are indif:ferent to. politics. The procedure 
they adopt resembles the practice of the American rather than the 
British trade unions: they press their views on all the parties, leaving 
each to decide its own policy. The unions are naturally well aware of 
where their best friends are. 1.rhe tradi ti.onal sympathy with the 
Socialist Movement, now represented by the SPD (the Social Democratic 
Party), holds good. But the absence of a formal connection with the 
SPD has resulted in differences of attitude towards a number of questions. 
In particular the trade unions are primarily concerned to secure the 
maximum benefits for their members irrespective o.f the :prevailing 
~oonamic system. For this reason they have not come out in open con-
flict with the CDU ( the Christian Democratic Union) which has headed 
all postwar German goverrnnents. This party is wedded to the principles 
of private enterprise and a free market economy; but it embraces 
several progressive elements, whose roots go back to the former 
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Christian trade unions and whose outlook frequently corresponds with 
that of the German Trade Union Federation - the DGB. 
Attempts have been made to extErnd to the trade· unions in Eastern 
Germany the same practice of neutrality towards poli ticc:..l parties within 
the Federal Republic. Various conferences he.7e been held and committees 
established in an effort to find a formula for pr2.ctical cooperation in 
strictly unicn matters. But always without success, because the leaders 
of the Eastern unions are not democratically elected, being in effect 
little better than official appointees. 
The DGB by contrast is thoroughly democratic, all responsible 
officials from shop stewards to members of the Federal Executives being 
directly or indirectly elected by union members for fixed terms of 
office. Sixteen large unions are affiliated to the DGB and determine 
its polici0s. (In Eastern Germe.,ny the reverse applies: the central 
organisation dictates policy to the individual unions). The member 
unions are all organised on a.n industrial rather than an occupational 
basis, so that demarcation disputes can be se ~tL.Jd within the unions 
themselves. It will be seen that 1:ihe :::tru.cture of the German movement , 
reshaped as it was after the warj differs considerably from the British 
which has developed gradually over the years. 
:By the end of 1958 the membership of the DGB had climbed to 6.4 
million, an increase of about a million members in ten years. The pe.ak 
figure in the inter-war years was 9-10 mj_J.lion, a total which of course 
applied to the whole of Germany. This was rf;ached during the period of 
rampant inflation, an experience which very much coloured the unions' 
attitude to wage claims during the early postwar period. 
The sixteen unions affiliated to the DGB are:-
the engineering and metal workers, w:i.. th 1. 6million members; 
the public utilities and transport wo:vkera, with 850,000 uembers; 
the miners, with 594,000 members; 
the chemical, paper and pottery workers, with 473,000 members; 
the building and quarrying workers· with 4.40, OOO members; 
the railway workers, with 427,000 members; 
the textile workers, wi.th 390, OOO members; 
the f'ood c:1.lld cs,tering workers, with 310, OOO members; 
the postal worke:~'S, with 240, OOO members; 
the timber workers, with 187,000 members; 
the printing and :paper workers, with 133,000 members; 
the commerce, banking and insurance workers, with 117,000 members; 
the horticultural, agricultural and forestry workers, with 
94,000 members; 
the leather workers, Wi'.th 94, OOO members; 
the education and scientific workers, with 75,000 members; 
the art and craft workers, with 35,000 members. 
In addition there are several unions for white-collar wage-earners, 
notably civil servants, which are not affiliated to the DGB. 
Four points stand out in the policy of the DGB as adopted at the 
Munich Congress of 1949:i (i) the pursuit of full employment through 
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economic planning and respect for "the status of free men", (ii) the 
adopti~n of "co-determination" rights for organised labour in the 
direction and management of industry; (iii) the nationalisation of key 
industries, notably mining, heavy chemicals, power, iron and steel, 
public transport, and credit institutions; and (iv) the securing of 
social justice through the distribution of a fair share of industrial 
profits amongst workers, and the assurance of a living wage for the 
old and infirm. 
Of these objectives, the one unique to Germany is the principle 
of co-determination. Its adoption has represented the most important 
entry of the Ge~~·man trade unions into the politic al field,· with a 
view initially to offsetting the enormous power concentrated in a few 
hands in the giant combines of the Ru.hr. 
In the immediate postwar period, the unions had obtained represen-
tation on the new managerial and supervisory organs set up b;}7 the 
Allies for the coal and steel industries. :But this position was 
paradoxically lost when these industries were decartellised and sub-
jected to ordinary company law. Tho unions demanded that their rights 
should be restored and properly guaranteed. In 1951, after a bitter 
struggle, co-determination was 8Stablished for the coal and steel 
induEitries on a basis of parity with the shareholders' representatives. 
The supervisory boards, which are largely responsible for policy under 
German company law, are composed of five nouinees from the trade unions, 
another five by the shareholders, and one co-opted member. In addition 
trade unionists sit as directors responsible for labour and social 
questions on the boards of management. 
A less satisfactory measure· of co-determination was won in 1952 
for all concerns with five or more employees outside the coal and 
steel industries. In these cases labour representation ou the board 
is restricted to one-third of the m .. embers. 
It might seem to the outsider the .. t this system would seriously 
handicap the unions in their bargaining with employers. The Ger!lan 
unions are fully aware of this danger but are satisfied that the 
advantages they have gained outweigh this consideration in practice. 
Experience has proved, moreover, that the employees' fears lest co-
determination should paralyse business initiative are unfounded. 
The system has worked fairly smoothly, though not as well as the unions 
had hoped it would. 
·The DGB is now :fighting to consolidate and extend its achievements. 
One threat to the principle of co-determination has come from the 
planned amalgamation of the Mannesmar1n concern with its subsidiaries, 
which means that labour faces the prospect of losing its representation 
op. the subsidj.a.ries. Another threat comes from the moves by some 
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companies to transfer their headquarters to rn::ar-by Luxemburg, where 
the co-determination law does not apply. 1'he trade unions are also 
trying to have the co-determination legislation strengthened for other 
industries, and they 2,re demanding the establishment of a Federal 
Economic Council and various other bodies with equal representation for 
both labour and employers. 
The achievements of the trade unions i.n the field of co-determin-
ation have not been matched by any similar successes with regard to 
public ownership. Here in fact a losing rear-guard action is being 
fought. Far from the public sector of industry being extended, it is 
being contracted by the sale to the public of so-called popular shares 
in the mofit profitable enterprises left in the hands of the state 
following the collapse of the Nazi regime. The best known of th0se 
concerns is the Volkswagen works in which the famous motor car is 
produced. So far thj_s hns not been handed over to shareholders owing 
to strong trade union and political opposition which has managed to 
turn to good advantage a highly confu.sed legal situation. But several 
other enterprises 2.re being sold. 
The DGB's objections take two forms. First, the unprofitable 
state enterprises will obviousl;y not be sold t::1.nd will become a che.rge 
on the taxpr.yer, instead of having their losses set against the profits 
of the more efficient concerns. Secondly, and far more fundamental, the 
trade unions are very anxious about the growing concentration of 
German industry. They are highly sceptical about the prospects for the 
success of the government's attempt to spread the ownership of industry 
amongst fi. large number of shareholders. For the present the trade 
unions will probably try to counter these trends through seeking 
improvements to the system of co-determination, but they are showing 
growing interest in more public ownership, which clearly cannot be 
brought abou·t until there is a change of government. 
In any case the main weight of -the trade union movement has been 
increasingly exerted towards improving the wages, purchasing power, and 
conditions of work of its members. This reflects at one and the same 
time, first the determination of the unions to secure their due share 
of-the rapid advances in investment and hence production made possible 
by their policy of wage restraint in the past, and secondly the 
greater reluctance on the part of employers to concede higher wages 
at a time of mild recession. For all their efforts, wage increases in 
1958 were the lowest for four years. Even so these were substantially 
greater than in Britain. Some 8.3 million manual workers obtained 
increases in their guaranteed wages of 7.3 per cent, and 2.7 million 
clerical workers increases of 5.5 per cent, naking an average of 6.8 per 
cent by comparison with an avera~;e of 8 .O :per cent in 1957. It may be 
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noted that the cost of living increased by 3,1 per cent in 1958 and 
by 2.3 per cent in 1957. 
Ever since May Day 1952 the DGB he,S also demanded the introduction 
by stages of a 5 day 40 hour week. At present the 48 hour week is 
almost universally in force, but this year there he,ve been several 
notable advances. A 44 hour v11eek without loss of we,ges was introduced 
in February for 13,00 workers in the margarine industry. In January 
a 40 hour week was won for the first time for the 15,000 workers -
mainly women - in the cigarette industry. The outstanding development, 
after a vigorous campaign had been organised~ was the negotiation in 
April of a 40 hour week for the half million miners, at the temporary 
cost however of an 8/- drop in weekly rates to about £10. Nevertheless 
the loss in earnings is expected to be compensated for by a reduction in 
short time working which had extended to about a third of the coal 
pits in the Iulur, owing to the recession. It is interesting to note 
that the coal owners have in effect ,,1.greed with the Miners' Union that 
a shorter working week is o:ne method of ameliorating the present 
difficult position in the industry. An attempt is now being made to 
secure similar terms in the textile industry, which has likewise been 
hard hit by the ~ecession. 
OthGr recent advances were obtained through the government's 
commitments to bring about equal pay for women by 1962 and three 
weeks holiday with pay. These follow from the ratification and 
application of the Treaty of Rome setting up the Common Market. 
:Equal pay and more ample holiday r:,1101.vs_nces have both beGn planks in 
th<:? DGB' s action programme for several y,aars; there are over a million 
women members of trade unions. 
The trade union movement provides its members with a number of 
special services, besidt3S advancing their claims in the economy. A 
bank is operated by the DGB in conjunction with affiliated unions and 
the cooperatives. Through its own building society the DGB is able to 
alleviate the shortage of houses for workers. An "Old Peoples Welfare 
Organisation" has also been established. Considerable efforts are made 
in the fields of education and vocational training, through various 
residential colleges and other establishments run by the DGB itself, 
the individual unions or the cooperatives. 
Worthy of special mention is the Trade Union Economic and Scientific 
Institute. It is widely recognised in academic and other circles out-
side the trade union movement for the high standards of its advanced 
research work, which is of course of considerable practical value to 
the unions themselves. In addition, most unions are very well equipped 
with qualified research staffs of their own, and are thus amply 
furnished with technical data about the increasingly complex 
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industrial problems with which they are faced. 
The DGB is naturally still far from cvchieving many of its short 
term objective:s, let a.lone its long term aims. The wonder is, however, 
that it has been so successful despite the influx of millions of 
refugees from Eastern Germany who htwe a.ff ord.ed such a substantial 
pool of unemployed as, inevitably, to gravely handicap the trade unions. 
But conditions have changed, for Germany is prosperous and unemployment 
this April had fallen to 396,000 - equivalent to 2.0 per cent of the 
working population compared with J.O per cent in April 1958. The stage 
is set for fresh advances. Before these can come about, however, 
considerable struggles must be endured. 
Today the German trade unions face the equivalent of their Taff 
Vale case. In 1956, 25,000 members of the Metal Workers union, proudly 
claimed by its chairman Otto Brenner to be the strongest in the world, 
went through a remarkable four months strike which cost the amployers 
some £20 million in production lotrnes. Last November the Federal 
Labour Court in Kassel declared that the union must pay dam.ages. 
Unless this judw;ment is revers0d by a higher court or through new 
legislation, it may be oxpccted that the already tense relations in 
German industry will become extremely acute. 
